Taming the Basel leverage cycle by Aymanns, Christoph et al.
		
Taming the 
Basel Leverage 
Cycle
Christoph Aymanns 
Fabio Caccioli 
J. Doyne Farmer 
Vincent W.C. Tan 
SRC Discussion Paper No 42 
July 2015 
	
ISSN 2054-538X 
Abstract  
Effective risk control must make a tradeoff between the microprudential risk of 
exogenous shocks to individual institutions and the macroprudential risks caused by 
their systemic interactions. We investigate a simple dynamical model for understanding 
this tradeoff, consisting of a bank with a leverage target and an unleveraged 
fundamental investor subject to exogenous noise with clustered volatility. The 
parameter space has three regions: (i) a stable region, where the system always 
reaches a fixed point equilibrium; (ii) a locally unstable region, characterized by cycles 
and chaotic behavior; and (iii) a globally unstable region. A crude calibration of 
parameters to data puts the model in region (ii). In this region there is a slowly building 
price bubble, resembling a “Great Moderation”, followed by a crash, with a period of 
approximately 10-15 years, which we dub the Basel leverage cycle. We propose a 
criterion for rating macroprudential policies based on their ability to minimize risk for a 
given average leverage. We construct a one parameter family of leverage policies that 
allows us to vary from the procyclical policies of Basel II or III, in which leverage 
decreases when volatility increases, to countercyclical policies in which leverage 
increases when volatility increases. We find the best policy depends critically on three 
parameters: The average leverage used by the bank; the relative size of the bank and 
the fundamentalist, and the amplitude of the exogenous noise. Basel II is optimal when 
the exogenous noise is high, the bank is small and leverage is low; in the opposite limit 
where the bank is large or leverage is high the optimal policy is closer to constant 
leverage. We also find that systemic risk can be dramatically decreased by lowering 
the leverage target adjustment speed of the banks. 
 
Keywords: Financial stability, capital regulation, systemic risk. 
JEL classification: G01, G11, G20. 
 
This paper is published as part of the Systemic Risk Centre’s Discussion Paper Series. 
The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in funding the SRC 
is gratefully acknowledged [grant number ES/K002309/1]. 
 
Christoph Aymanns, Institute of New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, 
and Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford 
Fabio Caccioli, Department of Computer Science, University College London, and 
Systemic Risk Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science 
J. Doyne Farmer, Institute of New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, 
Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford, and Santa Fe Institute 
Vincent W.C. Tan, Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford 
 
Published by 
Systemic Risk Centre 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in 
writing of the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than 
that in which it is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should 
be sent to the editor at the above address. 
 
© Christoph Aymanns, Fabio Caccioli, J. Doyne Farmer and Vincent W.C. Tan 
submitted 2015 
Taming the Basel Leverage Cycle
Christoph Aymannsa,b, Fabio Cacciolic,d, J. Doyne Farmera,b,e, Vincent W.C.
Tanb
aInstitute of New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford,
Oxford OX2 6ED, UK
bMathematical Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3LB, UK
cDepartment of Computer Science, University College London, London, WC1E 6BT, UK
dSystemic Risk Centre, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, London, UK
eSanta Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
Abstract
Eﬀective risk control must make a tradeoﬀ between the microprudential risk
of exogenous shocks to individual institutions and the macroprudential risks
caused by their systemic interactions. We investigate a simple dynamical model
for understanding this tradeoﬀ, consisting of a bank with a leverage target and
an unleveraged fundamental investor subject to exogenous noise with clustered
volatility. The parameter space has three regions: (i) a stable region, where
the system always reaches a ﬁxed point equilibrium; (ii) a locally unstable re-
gion, characterized by cycles and chaotic behavior; and (iii) a globally unstable
region. A crude calibration of parameters to data puts the model in region
(ii). In this region there is a slowly building price bubble, resembling a “Great
Moderation”, followed by a crash, with a period of approximately 10-15 years,
which we dub the Basel leverage cycle. We propose a criterion for rating macro-
prudential policies based on their ability to minimize risk for a given average
leverage. We construct a one parameter family of leverage policies that allows
us to vary from the procyclical policies of Basel II or III, in which leverage
decreases when volatility increases, to countercyclical policies in which leverage
increases when volatility increases. We ﬁnd the best policy depends critically
on three parameters: The average leverage used by the bank; the relative size
of the bank and the fundamentalist, and the amplitude of the exogenous noise.
Basel II is optimal when the exogenous noise is high, the bank is small and
leverage is low; in the opposite limit where the bank is large or leverage is high
the optimal policy is closer to constant leverage. We also ﬁnd that systemic risk
can be dramatically decreased by lowering the leverage target adjustment speed
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1. Introduction
Borrowing in ﬁnance is often called “leverage”, which is inspired by the fact
that borrowing increases returns, much as a mechanical lever makes it possible
to increase forces. But leverage increases not only return but also risk, which
naturally motivates lenders to introduce constraints on its use.1
Because leverage goes up when prices go down, a drop in prices tightens
leverage constraints, which often forces investors to sell into falling markets.2
As investors sell into falling markets they cause prices to fall further. This
triggers a positive feedback loop in which selling depresses prices, which causes
further selling, which further tightens leverage constraints, etc. Similarly, posi-
tive news about prices causes a decline in perceived risk, which loosens leverage
constraints, which causes further price increases. These dynamics were termed
the leverage cycle by Geanakopolos.3 Constraining the use of leverage is clearly
beneﬁcial at the individual level. At the systemic level, however, the dynamics
induced by leverage constraints can lead to booms and busts; it is widely be-
lieved that excessive leverage caused or at least exacerbated the recent ﬁnancial
crisis.
1.1. Empirical motivation
The period encompassing the Great Moderation and the subsequent global
ﬁnancial crisis starting in late 2007 is a case in point for the strong correlation
between leverage, market volatility and asset prices. Detailed evidence over a
longer time horizon for the link between asset prices and leverage for various
types of ﬁnancial institutions is provided by Adrian and Shin (2010). In this
section we focus only on the Great Moderation and the subsequent ﬁnancial
crisis.
During the Great Moderation perceived volatility, as measured by the VIX
index of expected future volatility, declined consistently over several years, as
shown by the dotted line in Figure 1. At the same time, in a near mirror image
to volatility, asset prices (as measured by the S&P500 index) and leverage of
1Such a constraint may arise in a number of ways. If the investor is using collateralized
loans to fund its investments, it must maintain margin on its collateral. Alternatively, a regu-
lator may impose a risk contingent capital adequacy ratio. Finally, internal risk management
considerations may lead the investor to adopt a Value-at-Risk constraint. (In simple terms
Value-at-Risk is a measure of how much the bank could lose with a given small probability).
All of these cases eﬀectively impose a risk contingent leverage constraint.
2In principle, distressed banks can reduce their leverage in two ways: they can raise more
capital or sell assets. In practice most banks tend to do the latter, as documented in Adrian
and Shin (2008).
3Minsky was the ﬁrst author that we know of to describe the leverage cycle in qualitative
terms. The ﬁrst quantitative model is due to Geanakoplos (1997, 2003); Fostel and Geanako-
plos (2008); Geanakoplos (2010). See also the early model by Gennotte and Leland (1990),
which models the destabilizing eﬀects of leverage but does not model the cycle per se. An-
other relevant model is Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), where the authors investigate the
destabilizing feedback between funding liquidity and market liquidity. A further discussion
on the destabilizing eﬀects of margin can be found in Gorton and Metrick (2010).
3
12
3
4
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Date
R
eb
as
ed
 v
al
ue
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 2
00
2Q
3 Rebased
Leverage
S&P500
VIX
US Broker Dealers Leverage, S&P500, VIX
Figure 1: The leverage of US Broker-Dealers (solid black line) compared to the S&P500 index
(dashed blue line) and the VIX S&P500 (red dash-dotted line. Data is quarterly; see footnote
7.
ﬁnancial institutions (as measured by the leverage of US security broker dealers)
consistently increased.4 As ﬁnancial institutions expanded their leverage their
assets and liabilities grew correspondingly.
The Great Moderation came to a sudden and dramatic halt when the US
subprime mortgage crisis began to unfold in late 2007 and the subsequent ﬁ-
nancial crisis sent asset prices into a downward spiral. As asset prices began
to fall, market volatility increased. At the same time the leverage of ﬁnancial
institutions increased – in fact drastically so. This was due the fact that even
relatively small drops in asset prices can massively increase the leverage of ﬁ-
nancial institutions that are already highly leveraged. Financial institutions
responded quickly to increased market volatility and deleveraged by a factor of
2 in the span of one quarter.
This deleveraging likely had a drastic negative impact on asset prices. Of
course, many other factors aﬀected asset prices at that time, and this evidence
is only anecdotal. Nonetheless, the correlation observed between asset prices,
volatility and leverage motivates the model that is developed here, which is de-
signed to address the following questions: How do leveraged investors respond to
changes in market prices? How are market prices aﬀected by investors’ portfolio
adjustments? How does this potential feedback loop aﬀect the overall dynam-
4 It should be noted that US security broker dealers are a somewhat extreme example
of leveraged ﬁnancial institutions and are not representative for the behavior of commer-
cial banks. Here we use their example to illustrate the stark correlation between leverage,
volatility and asset prices in an anecdotal way. A more nuanced evaluation can be found
in Adrian and Shin (2010). The data on US Security Broker Dealer Leverage, (deﬁned as
Assets/(Assets-Liabilities), is from US Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Data Package F.128
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/.
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ics of the ﬁnancial system? Finally, what should regulators do to control this
feedback loop, and how should they make an appropriate compromise between
microprudential and macroprudential regulation?
Our model suggests that the underlying cause of these events might have
been due to the simple combination of leverage and dynamic risk management
in the style of Basel II, and that the collapse of the housing bubble might
have been only the spark that happened to cause the crash. Of course the real
situation was complicated and this cannot be proven, but our model makes this
explanation plausible.
1.2. Review of literature on leverage cycles
There are many possible mechanisms that have been conjectured to drive
leverage cycles. In the original model of Geanakoplos investor heterogeneity
plays a key role: The most optimistic investors are also the most leveraged
investors. The leveraged investors are hit harder by downturns, which reduces
their market power, which negatively impacts average expectations and ampliﬁes
downward price movements. Many other factors have been conjectured to drive
leverage cycles, including short-termism, herding and incentive distortions.5
Here we focus on the side-eﬀects of risk management as a driver of leverage
cycles. A passive investor, i.e. an investor that never rebalances his or her
portfolio, is countercyclical in the sense that falling prices drive leverage up and
vice versa. In contrast, Adrian and Shin (2008) point out that many investors,
such as commercial banks, use constant leverage targets, creating a positive
feedback between the demand for an asset and its return. Since falling prices
increase leverage, maintaining a constant target leverage causes investors to sell
into a falling market and to buy into a rising market. Such behavior is inherently
destabilizing: Higher (lower) demand leads to higher (lower) prices, that further
increase (reduce) demand, and so on.
Adrian and Shin (2008) document even more destabilizing behavior by in-
vestors such as investment banks. These investors are actively procyclical, i.e.
they lower leverage targets when prices fall and raise them when prices rise.
This further ampliﬁes the potentially destabilizing positive feedback between
demand and returns. Adrian and Shin argue that this can be due to regula-
tory risk management, since a risk neutral investor subject to a Value-at-Risk
constraint increases her leverage when volatility is low and reduces it when
volatility is high. In fact, volatility and prices cannot be disconnected. There
is empirical evidence for a negative correlation between returns and volatility
(Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; Nelson, 1991; Engle and Ng, 1993). This implies
that when prices increase (decrease), volatility decreases (increases) and target
leverage goes up (down), which results in leverage procyclicality. The fact that
minimum capital requirements based on VaR are likely to result in procyclical
behavior was also pointed out by Estrella (2004).
5See for example Aikman et al. (2012), de Nicolo et al. (2012) and Gennaioli et al. (2012).
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Since VaR risk management induces the procyclicality of leverage with re-
spect to prices, in the following we will refer to a procyclical leverage control
policy as one for which banks are required to reduce their target leverage when
volatility increases, and are allowed to increase it when volatility decreases. It
is important to stress that this feedback can have signiﬁcant macro-economic
consequences. For instance Van den Heuvel (2002) investigates the eﬀect of cap-
ital regulation on the transmission of monetary policy via bank lending, ﬁnding
that leverage procylicality can lead to an ampliﬁcation of monetary policy.
In contrast to the procyclical case, we will refer to a countercyclical leverage
control policy as one for which banks can target a higher leverage if volatility
is high, but are required to reduce their leverage when volatility is low. The
rationale for such a policy is to counteract the potentially destabilizing positive
feedback between demand and returns that occurs under procyclical policies.
We show that an actively countercyclical policy can also be destabilizing. In
fact, under a policy that is countercyclical with respect to risk, we observe in our
model that the relation between returns and volatility can be reversed, and that
higher (lower) volatility is associated with higher (lower) prices. Therefore, if an
investor buys when volatility increases, this can further increase volatility and
prices, which raises leverage targets, etc., also resulting in a positive feedback
loop. The challenge for policy makers is to ﬁnd a leverage control policy that
avoids the Scylla and Charybdis of excessively procyclical policies on one side
or excessively countercyclical policies on the other. The aim of this paper is to
understand how the cyclicality of leverage control policies aﬀects the properties
of the ﬁnancial system, and to seek the proper compromise between these two
extremes.
It has to be stressed that the concept of cyclicality we refer to in this paper
is with respect to risk, not with respect to the behavior of macroeconomic indi-
cators. For example, Drehmann and Gambacorta (2012) provide counterfactual
simulations showing how leverage control policies that are countercyclical with
respect to the diﬀerence between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-run aver-
age can help making the economy more stable. The focus of our paper, however,
is on the circumstances in which risk control can cause ﬁnancial instability, and
how to make an eﬀective tradeoﬀ between systemic vs. individual risk.
The consequences of procyclical leverage have now been studied by many
authors.6 The fact that feedback loops due to capital requirement constraints
can lead to the ampliﬁcation of shocks has been demonstrated, for example, by
Zigrand et al. (2010), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), Thurner et al. (2010) and
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012a, 2013). Aymanns and Farmer (2014) go be-
yond this by showing how leverage constraints can lead to an endogenous cycle,
i.e. one in which spontaneous oscillations occur. We call this the Basel lever-
6See for example Danielsson et al. (2001), Danielsson et al. (2004), Adrian and Shin (2008),
Shin (2010), Zigrand et al. (2010), Adrian et al. (2012), Tasca and Battiston (2012), Poledna
et al. (2013), Adrian and Shin (2014) and Brummitt et al. (2014).
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age cycle.7 While Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012a, 2013) study this through
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, Aymanns and Farmer (2014)
consider a more stylized setting where investment decisions of households and
unleveraged funds are not explicitly modeled. The latter model has the virtue
of being very simple, and also of showing how under bounded rationality en-
dogenous leverage cycles can occur even in a deterministic limit where there are
no shocks. In this paper we modify the model of Aymanns and Farmer (2014)
by adding a fundamental noise trader subject to exogenous noise, which allows
us to study the tradeoﬀ between micro and macro prudential regulation. We
also present a full stability analysis.
1.3. Summary of our contribution
Our main contribution is the identiﬁcation of optimal leverage control poli-
cies. As in the Aymanns and Farmer model, the exponent of the relationship
between perceived risk and target leverage is a free parameter. In this way it is
possible to capture both procyclical and countercyclical leverage control policies
in a single model. The ability to interpolate between procyclical and counter-
cyclical leverage control policies in one model allows us to compare policies of
diﬀerent “cyclicality” and study their eﬀectiveness in controlling leverage cycles.
In order to do this it is necessary to choose a criterion for selecting the
optimal policy. We believe a good policy is one that maximizes leverage at
a given level of overall risk to the ﬁnancial system. Maximizing leverage is
desirable because this means that the capital of the ﬁnancial system is put to full
use in providing credit to the real economy. In fact, for reasons of convenience
it is more feasible for us to minimize risk at a given leverage; this is essentially
equivalent, since the average leverage can be adjusted to match any desired risk
target (and the policy that is selected will be the same). We measure risk in
terms of realized shortfall, i.e. the average of large losses to the ﬁnancial system
as a whole.
The main result of this paper is that the optimal policy depends critically
on three parameters: the average leverage used by the bank; the relative size of
the bank and the fundamentalist; and the amplitude of the exogenous noise. A
procyclical leverage control policy such as that of Basel II is optimal when the
exogenous noise is high, the volatility is strongly clustered, the bank is small
and leverage is low; in the opposite limit where these conditions are not met
the optimal policy is closer to constant leverage.
2. A simple model of leverage cycles
2.1. Sketch of the model
We consider a ﬁnancial system composed of a leveraged investor (called a
bank for simplicity), an unleveraged fund investor, which we call the fund, and
7However bear in mind that this can occur even without any regulatory policy constraint,
due to prudent risk managers who limit the risk of individual institutions in isolation while
failing to properly take systemic risk into account.
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a passive outside lender that provides credit as required by the bank. The bank
and the fund make a choice between investing in a risky asset whose price is
determined endogenously vs. a risk free asset with ﬁxed price, which we will
call cash.
We focus on risk management by assuming the bank holds the relative weight
of the risky asset and cash ﬁxed. The bank’s risk management consists of two
components: First, we assume that the bank estimates the future volatility
of its investment in the risky asset by using an exponential moving average
of historical returns. Second, the bank uses the estimated volatility to set its
desired leverage. The target can be set either by internal risk management or
by externally imposed regulatory constraints: The net result is the same. If the
bank is below its desired leverage, it will borrow more and use the additional
funds to expand its balance sheet. Conversely, if it is above its desired leverage,
it will liquidate part of its investments and pay back part of its debt.
The fund is a proxy for the rest of the ﬁnancial system, i.e. the part that
does not do leverage targeting. Leverage targeting creates inherently unstable
dynamics, as it implies buying into rising markets and selling into falling mar-
kets. Thus it is necessary have at least one other investor who plays a stabilizing
role. We model the fund as a weakly fundamentalist investor whose investment
decisions are perturbed by exogenous random shocks reﬂecting information ﬂow
or decision processes outside the scope of the model. The exogenous random
shocks display clustered volatility. The fund investor and the bank interact
through the market for the risky asset and the market clearing price is deter-
mined by the investments of the fund and the bank.
Because of the clustered volatility, in the absence of any systemic eﬀects,
the bank should adjust its leverage to maintain a constant Value at Risk. With
systemic eﬀects this becomes more complicated, which is what this model allows
us to investigate.
In addition to its portfolio management decisions, we assume that the bank
tries to maintain a constant target equity. This is consistent with the empirical
observation that the equity of commercial and investment banks is roughly
constant over time; see Adrian and Shin (2008). In order to conserve cash ﬂow
in our model, we assume that dividends paid out by the bank when the equity
exceeds the target are invested in the fund, while new capital invested in the
bank when the equity is below the target is withdrawn from the fund. This
prevents all the wealth from accumulating with either the bank or the fund and
makes the asymptotic dynamics stationary.
Figure 2 shows a diagrammatic representation of the model. The main
driver of the dynamics is the feedback loop between changes in the price of the
risky asset and balance sheet adjustments: The bank reacts to price changes
to maintain its capital requirements under its perception of risk; similarly the
fund invests as one expect from a fundamentalist, buying when prices are below
value and selling when they are above. The balance sheet adjustments of the
bank and the fund determine the price, which in turn feeds back to determine
their decisions.
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risk estimate
adjust
balance sheet
bank
underleveraged → new borrowing
overleveraged → liquidate assets
detect
mispricing
update
decision
fund
asset
revaluation
regulatory
constraint
exogenous
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equity ﬂow
Figure 2: Diagrammatic representation of the model: The bank and the fund interact through
price formation. The bank’s demand for the risky asset depends on its estimated risk based
on historical volatility and on its capital requirement. The demand of the fund consists of
a mean reverting component that tends to push the price towards its fundamental value; in
addition there is a random exogenous shock to the fund’s demand that has clustered volatility.
Price adjustments aﬀect the bank’s estimation of risk and the mean reverting behavior of the
fund. The cash ﬂow consistency in the model is enforced by equity ﬂowing between the bank
and the fund in equal amounts. The driver of the endogenous dynamics is the feedback loop
between price changes, volatility and demand for the risky asset.
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2.2. Leverage regulation
The most important ingredient of our model is the fact that the bank is
subject to a capital requirement policy. The leverage ratio8 of the bank is
deﬁned as
λ(t) =
Total Assets
Equity
, (1)
and the capital requirement policy implies a leverage constraint of the type
λ(t) ≤ λ¯(t), i.e. the bank is allowed a maximum leverage λ¯(t). A cap on
leverage is equivalent to the existence of a minimum capital buﬀer that the bank
is required to keep to absorb losses. Conditional on the leverage constraint, it
can be shown that the return on equity of the bank is maximized if λ(t) = λ¯(t)
(see for instance Shin (2010)). We therefore assume that the bank always targets
its maximum allowed leverage λ¯(t).9
We assume that λ¯(t) depends on the bank’s estimate of the volatility of
the risky asset, i.e. λ¯(t) = F (σ2(t)), where σ2(t) is the bank’s perceived risk.
Although nothing we do here depends on this, to gain intuition it is useful to
compute the function F under the special case of a Value-at-Risk constraint
with normally distributed returns. In this case the bank’s target leverage is
given by (see for example Corsi et al. (2013)):
λ¯(t) = FVaR(σ
2(t)) =
1
σ(t)Φ−1(a)
∝ 1
σ(t)
,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal, a is the VaR
quantile, and σ the volatility of the risky asset. Under this speciﬁcation the
bank increases its leverage when the volatility of the risky asset diminishes
and decreases its leverage in the opposite case. Motivated by Adrian and Shin
(2014), we classify leverage policies as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. A leverage policy F (σ2(t)) is procyclical if dF/dσ2 < 0 and
countercyclical if dF/dσ2 > 0.10
8We use this deﬁnition of leverage in analogy to the Tier 1 regulatory leverage ratio (Tier
1 capital over bank total assets). An alternative deﬁnition of the leverage ratio only considers
risky assets in the numerator. Since in our model the bank holds the share of risky assets to
total assets ﬁxed, this alternative deﬁnition simply introduces a multiplicative constant into
the leverage calculation and does not aﬀect the qualitative outcome of our model.
9 In reality banks usually keep more capital than required by regulation in order to reduce
the cost of recapitalization or portfolio adjustments associated with violation of the minimal
capital requirement. Using this perspective, Peura and Keppo (2006) explain the pattern of
capital buﬀers observed in a sample of US commercial banks. However, note that our results
remain valid even if we assume that banks hold more capital than required by the regulator.
We only require that the resulting bank capital buﬀer responds to changes in perceived risk
in a well deﬁned way, i.e. in our model changes in the capital buﬀer are more important than
the level of the capital buﬀer.
10 This deﬁnition could be generalized for any risk measure; we use the standard deviation
σ for simplicity.
10
A class of leverage control policies that allows us to interpolate between
procyclical and countercyclial leverage control policies is given by
λ¯(t) = F(α,σ20 ,b)(σ(t)) := α(σ
2(t) + σ20)
b, (2)
where α > 0, σ20 > 0 and b ∈ [−0.5, 0.5]. We refer to α as the bank’s riskiness.
The larger α the larger the bank’s target leverage for a given level of perceived
risk σ2(t).11 For the special case where returns are normal with b = −0.5 and
σ20 = 0, α is linked to the quantile used to measure VaR by the inverse cumula-
tive normal distribution. In the more general case where there are heavy tails or
with other choices of parameters this correspondence is no longer valid. How-
ever, since the variance of returns is ﬁnite, under the Chebyshev’s bound VaR
is bounded by a quantity inversely proportional to the standard deviation of
the return distribution, so the conjectured relationship in Equation (2) remains
qualitatively correct. The relationship between α and risk remains monotonic
under any sensible risk measure, and one can simply think of α as a risk param-
eter and Equation (2) as a particular choice of F , corresponding to a volatility
estimate based on historical standard deviation.
The parameter b is called the cyclicality parameter, due to the fact that
F(α,σ20 ,b) is procyclical for b < 0 and countercyclical for b > 0 (see Deﬁnition 1).
For procyclical policies the leverage is inversely related to risk, i.e. leverage is
low when risk is high and vice versa. For countercyclical policies the opposite
is true; when risk is high leverage is also high, see Figure 3. It is important to
note that our deﬁnition of policy cyclicality does not refer to macroeconomic
measures such the credit-to-GDP ratio or asset prices. Instead it is deﬁned
solely by the bank’s response to changes in perceived risk. In this sense the
countercyclical policies proposed in this model diﬀer from the countercyclical
capital buﬀer proposed by the Bank of England, see FPC (2014), which keys oﬀ
the credit-to-GDP ratio.
Finally, the parameter σ20 bounds the leverage control policy from above
for b < 0 such that F(α,σ20 ,b) ≤ α(σ20)b and from below for b > 0 such that
F(α,σ20 ,b) ≥ α(σ20)b. For the remainder of this paper we will restrict our analysis
to leverage control policies of the class F(α,σ20 ,b). We illustrate the three corner
cases of the above class of leverage control policies with σ20 > 0 in Figure 3.
2.3. Asset price dynamics
The bank’s target leverage λ¯(t) at time t deﬁnes a target portfolio value
A¯B(t) = λ¯(t)EB(t), where EB(t) is the equity of the bank. The diﬀerence be-
11 Note that under standard Value-at-Risk the bank’s leverage depends on the variance
of its entire portfolio which in our model includes non risky cash holdings. Usually, the
portfolio variance is computed as the inner product of the covariance matrix with the portfolio
weights. In our case this implies that the portfolio variance is simply σ2(t) scaled by the bank’s
investment weight in the risky asset wB. However, since we take wB constant throughout, the
resulting risk rescaling factor can be absorbed into α without loss of generality. Therefore, we
make F(α,σ20 ,b)
only a function of σ(t).
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Figure 3: Illustration of target leverage as a function of perceived risk based on Equation (2)
with σ20 > 0. Continuous blue line: procyclical policy with b = −0.5. Dashed green line:
constant leverage policy with b = 0. Dotted red line: countercyclical policy with b = 0.5.
Continuous grey lines show relation to σ0.
tween the target portfolio and the current portfolio then determines the change
of the balance sheet ΔB(t) required for the bank to achieve its target leverage:
• If ΔB(t) > 0, the bank will borrow ΔB(t) and invest this amount into
the risky and the risk free asset according the bank’s portfolio weights.
• If ΔB(t) < 0, the bank will liquidate part of its portfolio and pay back
ΔB(t) of its liabilities.
The evolution of the fund’s portfolio weight in the risky asset depends on
the asset’s price relative to a constant fundamental value μ, and also on random
innovations. The fund investor therefore combines two economic mechanisms:
(1) The constant fundamental value means that the price of the risky asset is
ultimately anchored on the performance of unmodeled macro-economic condi-
tions, which we assume are eﬀectively constant over the length of one run of
our model. (2) We allow random innovations in the portfolio weight that reﬂect
exogenous shocks.
We assume that the fund invests a fraction wF(t) of its total assets in the
risky asset, and that the time evolution of wF(t) follows a mean reverting process
with a GARCH(1,1) noise term. Thus, the fundamentalist investor provides
a source of time varying exogenous volatility to the model. It is important
that the exogenous volatility is time varying as this motivates the need for
microprudential leverage control: To minimize risk, the bank must estimate the
expected future volatility and adjust its leverage accordingly.
Given the aggregate demand of the bank and the fund, and assuming for
simplicity that there is a supply of exactly one unit of the risky asset that is
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inﬁnitely divisible, the price of the risky asset is determined through market
clearing by equating demand and supply.
2.4. Time evolution
The model evolves in discrete time-steps of length τ . We make this a free
parameter so that the model has well-deﬁned dynamics in the continuum limit
τ → 0, which is useful for calibration. At each time-step the bank and the fund
update their balance sheets as follows:
• The bank updates its historically-based estimate of future volatility and
computes its new target leverage accordingly. Volatility estimation is done
using an exponential moving average with an approach similar to Risk-
Metrics (see Longerstaey (1996));
• The bank pays dividends or raises capital to reach its target equity E;
• The bank determines how many shares of the risky asset it needs to trade
to reach its target leverage;
• At the same time, the fundamentalist fund submits its demand for the
risky asset;
• The market clearing price for the risky asset is computed and trades oc-
cur.12
2.5. The model as a dynamical system
The dynamics of our model can be described as an iterated map for the state
variable x(t), deﬁned as
x(t) = [σ2(t), wF(t), p(t), n(t), LB(t), p
′(t)]T, (3)
where σ is the historical estimation of the volatility of the risky asset; wF is the
fraction of wealth invested by the fund in the risky asset; p the current price
of the risky asset; n the share of the risky asset owned by the bank; LB the
liabilities of the bank; and p′ is the lagged price of the asset, i.e. the price at the
previous time step. A detailed derivation of the model is presented in Appendix
12 It is important to note that the decision concerning equity and investment adjustments is
taken before the current trading price of the risky asset is revealed. We therefore assume that
the bank uses the price of the previous time step as a proxy for the expected trading price,
and acts accordingly. This assumption of myopic expectations marks a signiﬁcant departure
of our model from the general equilibrium setting of Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012b) and
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2013), but it is common in the literature on heterogeneous agents
in economics (see for instance Hommes (2006)).
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A. Here we simply present the model and provide some basic intuition. Let us
introduce the following deﬁnitions:
Bank assets AB(t) = p(t)n(t)/wB,
Target leverage λ¯(t) = α(σ2(t) + σ20)
b,
Balance sheet adjustment ΔB(t) = τθ(λ¯(t)(AB(t)− LB(t))−AB(t)),
Equity redistribution κB(t) = −κF(t) = τη(E − (AB(t)− LB(t))),
Bank cash cB(t) = (1− wB)n(t)p(t)/wB + κB(t),
Fund cash cF(t) = (1− wF(t))(1− n(t))p(t)/wF(t) + κF(t).
The parameters θ and η determine how aggressive the bank is in reaching its
targets for leverage and equity respectively (i.e. the bank aims at reaching the
targets on time horizons of the order 1/θ and 1/η).
The model can be written as a dynamical system in the form
x(t+ τ) = g(x(t)), (4)
where the function g is the following 6-dimensional map:
σ2(t+ τ) = (1− τδ)σ2(t) + τδ
(
log
[
p(t)
p′(t)
]
tVaR
τ
)2
, (5a)
wF(t+ τ) = wF(t) +
wF(t)
p(t)
[
τρ(μ− p(t)) +√τsξ(t)] , (5b)
p(t+ τ) =
wB(cB(t) + ΔB(t)) + wF(t+ τ)cF(t)
1− wBn(t)− (1− n(t))wF(t+ τ) , (5c)
n(t+ τ) =
wB(n(t)p(t+ τ) + cB(t) + ΔB(t))
p(t+ τ)
, (5d)
LB(t+ τ) = LB(t) + ΔB(t), (5e)
p′(t+ τ) = p(t). (5f)
Each of these equations can be understood as follows:
(a) The expected volatility σ2 of the risky asset is updated through an expo-
nential moving average. The parameter τδ ∈ (0, 1) deﬁnes the length of
the time-window over which the historical estimation is performed, while
the parameter tVaR represents the time-horizon used by the bank in the
calculation of VaR.
(b) The adjustment of the fund’s risky asset portfolio weight wF drives the price
towards the fundamental value μ, with an adjustment rate τρ ∈ (0, 1). The
demand of the fund also depends on exogenous noise, which is assumed to
be a normal random variable ξ(t) with amplitude s(t) ≥ 0. The amplitude
varies in time so that the variable χ(t) = s(t)ξ(t) follows a GARCH(1,1)
process. The factors of τ guarantee the correct scaling as τ → 0.
(c) The market clears. cF(t) and cB(t) are the amount of cash held respectively
by the fund and the bank.
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Symbol Description Default Unit
Bank τ Time step 0.1 year
δ Memory for volatility estimation 0.5 year−1
tVaR Horizon for VaR calculation 0.1 year
σ20 Risk oﬀset 10
−6 1
b Cyclicality of leverage control −0.5 (v) 1
α Risk level 0.075 (v) 1
E Bank’s equity target 2.27 (v) 1
wB Bank’s weight for risky asset 0.3 (v) 1
θ Balance sheet adjustment speed 9.5 (v) year−1
η Equity redistribution speed 10 year−1
Fund μ Fundamental value 25 1
ρ Mean reversion 0.1 year−1
GARCH a0 Baseline return variance 10
−3 1
a1 Error autoregressive term 0.016 1
b1 Variance autoregressive term 0.87 1
Table 1: Overview of parameters for the numerical model solution. Values marked with (v)
indicate that they are subject to change from their default values; “1” indicates that the
parameter is dimensionless.
(d) The bank ownership of the risky asset n(t+1) adjusts according to market
clearing.
(e) Bank liabilities are updated to account for the change ΔB(t) in the asset
side of the balance sheet.
(f) The lagged price variable p′(t) is required to complete the state vector, and
make the map a ﬁrst order dynamical system of the form given in Equation
(4).
3. Examples of leverage cycles
In order to explore the dynamical behavior of the model we solve it numeri-
cally. For now we will only consider leverage control policies that are procyclical;
in particular we choose b = −0.5 throughout this section, corresponding to the
case of risk management under VaR.
3.1. Model calibration
While this model is too stylized to be fully calibrated, approximate values
for some key parameters can be obtained. This then allows us to test the realism
of some of the properties of the model. In the following we will brieﬂy discuss
the choice and eﬀect of these key parameters, including the timescale of the risk
estimation, the balance sheet adjustment speeds and bank riskiness. A full list
of parameters is provided in Table 1.
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Timescale parameters
We have carefully constructed the dynamical system so that it reaches a
continuum limit as τ → 0. For computational eﬃciency we choose τ to be
the largest possible value with behavior similar to that in the continuum limit,
which results in a time step of τ = 0.1 years. As long as τ is this size or smaller
the results change very little.
The parameter δ sets the timescale for the exponential moving average used
to estimate volatility, and is the most important determinant of the overall
timescale of the dynamics. The characteristic time for the moving average is
tδ = 1/δ.
13 According to the RiskMetrics approach Longerstaey (1996), the
typical timescale used by market practitioners is tδ ≈ 2 years. We thus have
the luxury of being able to calibrate this parameter from “ﬁrst principles”. We
therefore set δ = 0.5 year−1, corresponding to a two year timescale, and keep it
ﬁxed throughout.
Another timescale parameter is tVaR, the time horizon over which returns are
computed for regulatory purposes. In practice, the timescale for the regulatory
capital requirements varies depending on the liquidity of the asset portfolio and
ranges from days to years. A good rule of thumb is to choose tVaR roughly equal
to the time needed to unwind the portfolio. We assume tVaR = τ = 0.1 years,
i.e. a little more than a month.
The parameters θ and η deﬁne how aggressive the bank is in reaching its
target for leverage and equity. Our default assumption is that the bank tries
to meet its target on a timescale of about one time step of the dynamics, and
so unless otherwise stated, in the following we set θ = 9.5 year−1 and η =
10 year−1. This ensures that the bank’s realized leverage is always close to its
target. We will vary the parameter θ and discuss how it aﬀects the stability of
the dynamics in Section 4.3.
Market power of the bank
The dynamics of this model depend on the competition between the stabi-
lizing properties of the fundamentalist and the destabilizing properties of the
bank. Thus to understand the parameters and their eﬀect on the dynamics
is it useful to understand how they inﬂuence the market power of the bank,
which is roughly speaking the product of the leverage λ and the relative size of
the banking sector R. To get a feeling of this, we show in Equation (A.10) in
the appendix that at the ﬁxed point equilibrium the parameters E, wB, wF, μ,
σ0, and α all jointly determine the fraction of the risky asset R owned by the
bank. Note that the numerical values chosen for the target equity E and the
fundamental price μ are arbitrary – only their ratio is important. We choose
the values of the above parameters in order to produce the desired value of
R (though we often vary α independently). Note that the bank represents all
13 The contribution to the moving average of a squared return y(t) observed at time t
is y(t + Δt) = (1 − τδ)Δt/τy(t) at time t + Δt. We deﬁne the typical time tδ such that
y(t+ tδ)/y(t) = 1/e. Thus tδ = −τ/ log[1− τδ] ≈ 1/δ for τδ  1.
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investors with leverage targets, and the set of institutions with a comparable
Value-at-Risk based leverage constraint14 is larger than the banking sector.
The other key parameter aﬀecting the stability of the model is the bank
riskiness α. Increasing α increases both the bank’s market power and its default
risk. Note that α is also related to tVaR by the fact that, all else equal, increasing
the timescale over which the risk is measured corresponds to taking more risk.
(Increasing α usually increases leverage, though as discussed in footnote 18 this
is not always true). The bank’s portfolio weight wB for the risky asset has a
similar eﬀect to the bank’s equity target E.15 Increasing any of these parameters
increases the bank’s market power.
In our calibration we choose a particular level of bank riskiness α and the
relative size of the bank and the fund to match two basic properties of the run up
and the subsequent collapse of leverage and asset prices during global ﬁnancial
crisis in 2008/2009. First, we seek a peak to trough ratio in the price of the
risky asset of roughly 2. Second, we target a period of oscillation of roughly
ten years. Matching these calibration targets comes at the price of achieving
realistic levels of bank leverage in our simulations. Given our choice for α we
obtain levels of bank leverage of around 6. This is below typically observed
levels of leverage of around 20. The fact that we cannot calibrate our model
to match several calibration targets simultaneously is a clear weakness of the
model, but is not surprising given its simplicity. It should also be noted that
due to hedging banks may be able to achieve levels of risk that are much lower
than that of a single bare asset as we model here, and this may explain the
discrepancy in leverage.
Finally, we pick parameters for the fund GARCH process a0, a1 and b1
in order to achieve a randomly perturbed asset price path that still follows a
leverage cycle roughly as observed in Figure 1.
3.2. Overview of model dynamics
We now build some intuition about the model dynamics. First, consider
the extreme case where E → 0, i.e. where the market power of the bank
is negligible so that the price dynamics are dominated by the fund. This is
the purely microprudential case where the bank’s actions have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the market and the only source of volatility is exogenous. In this case
(s > 0) we expect the price to perform a mean reverting random walk around
the fundamental price μ. In the deterministic case, i.e. s = 0, the fund updates
its portfolio weight until p(t) = μ, i.e. until the price has converged to the
fundamental price and the system settles to a ﬁxed point equilibrium.
When E is large enough that the bank has a signiﬁcant impact on the price
process the dynamics are less straightforward. We refer to this scenario as the
macroprudential case. Suppose, for example, that there is a negative shock in
14In principle the constraint can be either imposed by a regulator, creditors or internal risk
management.
15 In fact, it can be shown the the critical leverage is inversely proportional to wB.
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the investment of the fund. This negative shock will lead to an increase in the
perceived risk σ2(t). Under a procyclical leverage control policy an increase in
perceived risk causes a decline in the bank’s leverage constraint. As a conse-
quence the bank will have to deleverage in the time step following the negative
shock, i.e. ΔB(t) < 0. If the bank decreases its position and it has non-negligible
market impact, the price will drop for ΔB(t) < 0 ceteris paribus. This is clear
from Equation A.7 in the appendix. Thus an initial negative shock can be am-
pliﬁed by the bank’s deleveraging response. This destabilizing feedback loop
is a key ingredient for what is to come and distinguishes risk management in
the macroprudential case from the microprudential case. In the macropruden-
tial case the bank’s risk management aﬀects the system’s state and introduces
endogenous volatility on top of exogenous volatility.
To illustrate the dynamics of the model we will investigate the following four
scenarios:
(i) Deterministic, microprudential: E = 10−5 and s = 0.
(ii) Deterministic, macroprudential: E = 2.27 and s = 0.
(iii) Stochastic, microprudential: E = 10−5 and s > 0.
(iv) Stochastic, macroprudential: E = 2.27 and s > 0.
Unless otherwise stated all parameters are as speciﬁed in Table 1. The ﬁrst
two cases are for the deterministic limit with s = 0, which is useful to gain
intuition. The last two cases are with more realistic levels of exogenous noise.
We summarize our results for scenarios (i) and (ii) in Figure 4 and for scenarios
(iii) and (iv) in Figure 5.
The microprudential scenarios (i) and (iii) behave as expected: In the de-
terministic limit the systemic simply settles into a ﬁxed point with prices equal
to fundamental values. When there is exogenous noise the system makes ex-
cursions away from the ﬁxed point but never drifts far away from it, and the
dynamics remain relatively simple.
In contrast the macroprudential scenarios (ii) and (iv) display large oscil-
lations both in leverage and price. We refer to this oscillation as the Basel
leverage cycle. Surprisingly, the oscillations occur even in the deterministic
limit, i.e. without any external shocks. During the cycle the price and leverage
slowly rise and then suddenly fall, with a period of about Δt ≈ 15 years in the
deterministic case.
In the stochastic case we observe a period of about Δt ≈ 10 years. This
is roughly on the order of magnitude of the period of the Great Moderation
and the subsequent ﬁnancial crisis. Note that the period of oscillation depends
strongly on the risk estimation horizon tδ, but this is set to two years based on
behavioral data.16
16 In fact, the period is roughly proportional to 1/tδ . The period becomes large for very
low values of δτ and then declines as the risk estimation horizon is increased – for the range of
τδ the variation of the period ranges over roughly two orders of magnitude. The period also
depends on the values of η, tVaR, θ, wB and α. As η or tVaR are increased the period increases.
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Figure 4: Time series of price and leverage in the deterministic case. Left panel: scenario (i)
– microprudential, the fund dominates the bank (E = 10−5), i.e. the bank has no signiﬁcant
market impact. In this case the system goes to a ﬁxed point equilibrium where the leverage
and price of the risky asset remain constant. Right panel: scenario (i) – macroprudential, the
bank has signiﬁcant market impact (E = 2.27). In this case the bank’s risk management leads
to persistent oscillations in leverage and price of the risky asset with a time period of roughly
15 years.
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Figure 5: Time series of price and leverage in the stochastic case. Left panel: scenario (iii) –
microprudential, the fund dominates the bank (E = 10−5), i.e. the bank has no signiﬁcant
market impact. In this case the price is driven by the fund’s trading activity and performs
a mean reverting random walk around the fundamental value μ = 25. Right panel: scenario
(iv) – macroprudential, the bank has signiﬁcant market impact (E = 2.27). In this case the
bank’s risk management leads to irregular oscillations in leverage and price of the risky asset
that are similar to the deterministic case.
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The oscillations have the following economic interpretation: Suppose we
begin at about t = 140 years in the left panel of Figure 4, with leverage low,
perceived risk high, and prices low but increasing. The perceived risk slowly
decreases as the memory of the past crisis fades. From a mechanical point of
view this is due to the smoothing action of the exponential moving average. As
the moving average is updated on each timestep, the volatility σ2 decreases;
this causes the leverage to increase, and the bank buys more shares to meet its
increased leverage target. The change in price is lower than the current historical
average, so on the next step the volatility σ2 drops, driving the leverage higher.
As the leverage becomes very high the system becomes increasingly fragile.
In the phase space the system approaches a hyperbolic ﬁxed point where the
leverage is so large that that a crash occurs. The downward crash ultimately
comes to an end by the increasingly heavy investment of the fundamentalist
fund. After the crash volatility is high and leverage is low, and the cycle repeats
itself.
The fragility that drives the crashes comes from the fact that at high levels
of leverage a small increase in risk is suﬃcient to cause a drastic tightening of
the leverage constraint. This intuition can be made precise by comparing the
derivative of the leverage control policy for high vs. low leverage; for convenience
we take σ20 	 1.17 The result is that
dF(α,σ20 ,−0.5)
dσ2(t)
(σ2(t)) =
{
−0.5/σ0 	 0 , for σ2(t) → 0 ∧ σ20 	 1
0 , for σ2(t) → ∞ ∧ σ20 	 1
In the high leverage limit, i.e. when the perceived risk is small, the sensitivity
of the leverage target F to variations in risk tends to inﬁnity. In contrast the
sensitivity is zero in the opposite limit where leverage is low and perceived
risk is large. Thus increasing leverage of the banking system has a two-fold
destabilizing eﬀect: It can make the dynamics unstable and lead to chaos, but
it also makes it more sensitive to shocks, which can result in sudden deleveraging.
The leverage cycles are not strictly periodic due to the fact that the oscil-
lations are chaotic. This becomes clearer by plotting the dynamics in phase
space and then taking a Poincare´ section, as illustrated in Figure 6. The phase
plot makes the cyclical structure clearer; the 3D representation shows how the
ownership of the risky asset varies during the course of the leverage cycle (left
panel). The Poincare´ section is constructed by plotting ownership vs. per-
ceived risk every time the trajectory crosses the hyper-plane p(t) = 20 with the
price increasing (right panel). The Poincare´ section shows the characteristic
fractal structure, and shows the stretching and folding that makes the dynam-
As θ, α and wB are increased, i.e. as the system moves to a more unstable regime, the period
declines. However, for these parameters the variation in the period over the parameter range
is only on roughly one order of magnitude. The period of oscillation is robust to changes in
wF.
17 For b < 0 the parameter σ0 imposes a cap on the target leverage; larger values for σ20
would make this unrealistically low.
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Figure 6: Left panel: Three dimensional phase plot of the system’s attractor when there is
a deterministic leverage cycle. Right panel: A Poincare´ section is constructed by recording
values for the bank ownership of the risky asset (y-axis) and the perceived risk (x-axis) when-
ever the price is increasing and p(t) = 20, repeating for 106 time steps. This exhibits the
characteristic stretching and folding associated with chaotic dynamics.
ics chaotic. The fact that these dynamics are chaotic is conﬁrmed in the next
section, where we do a stability analysis and compute the Lyapunov exponent.
In summary, depending on the choice of parameters, the model either goes
to a ﬁxed point (scenario (ii)) or shows chaotic irregular cycles (scenarios (i)
and (iii)). As expected the dynamics become more complicated when noise is
added, but the essence of the Basel leverage cycle persists even in the zero noise
limit.
4. Determinants of model stability
4.1. Deterministic case
In the deterministic case the standard tools of linear stability analysis can
be used to characterize the boundary between the ﬁxed point equilibrium and
leverage cycles. In this section we will use this to characterize the behavior of
the system as the risk parameter α and the cyclicality parameter b are varied.
We begin by studying the deterministic case, where we can compute things
analytically, and then present numerical results for the stochastic case. The
details of the stability analysis are presented in Appendix A.
The system has a unique ﬁxed point equilibrium x∗, given by
x∗ = (σ2∗, w∗F, p
∗, n∗, L∗B, p
′∗)
= (0, wF(0), μ,
1
μ
ασ2b0 EwB, (ασ
2b
0 − 1)E, μ).
(6)
This corresponds to a leverage λ∗ and relative size of bank to fund Rc(x∗), given
by
λ∗ = ασ2b0 ,
R(x∗) =
A∗B
A∗F
=
λ∗E∗B
(1− n∗)p∗/w∗F
.
(7)
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At the equilibrium x∗ the price is constant at its fundamental value and the
bank is at its target leverage. The stability of the equilibrium depends on the
parameters. Regime (i) observed in the numerical simulations of the previous
section corresponds to the stable case. In this case, regardless of initial condi-
tions, the system will asymptotically settle into the ﬁxed point x∗. In contrast,
when the ﬁxed point x∗ is unstable there are two possibilities. One is that there
is a leverage cycle, in which the dynamics are locally unstable but exist on a
chaotic attractor that is globally stable; the other is that the system is globally
unstable, in which case the price either becomes inﬁnite or goes to zero.
In Figure 7 we show the results of varying the risk parameter α and the
cyclicality parameter b. The risk parameter α provides the natural way to vary
the risk of the bank, but the realized risk for a given α depends on parame-
ters due to other factors such as changes in volatility. For diagnostic purposes
leverage is a better measure.18 Figure 7 shows each of the three regimes, cor-
responding to the stable equilibrium, leverage cycles or global instability, as a
function of the leverage and the cyclicality parameter b. The boundary where
the ﬁxed point equilibrium becomes unstable is computed analytically based on
the leverage λ∗c where the modulus of the leading eigenvalue is one. The bound-
ary for globally unstable behavior is more diﬃcult to compute as it requires
numerical simulation.
This diagram reveals several interesting results. As expected, for low lever-
age the system is stable and for higher leverage it is unstable. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the critical leverage λ∗c is independent of b, and consequently the size
of the regime with the stable equilibrium is unaﬀected by whether the lever-
age control is procyclical or countercyclical. In the procyclical regime there is
a substantial area of parameter space with leverage cycles. For the counter-
cyclical regime, in contrast, there is only a small regime with leverage cycles.
Throughout most of the parameter range the system makes a direct transition
from the stable ﬁxed point equilibrium to global instability. The instability is
not surprising: In the countercyclical regime there is an unstable feedback loop
in which increasing leverage drives increasing prices and increasing volatility,
which further increases the leverage. Thus for high leverage there are unstable
regimes for both pro- and countercyclical behavior, but the instability is even
worse in the countercyclical regime.
4.2. Stability when there is exogenous noise
In the case where there is exogenous noise we can only measure the stability
numerically. This is done by computing the largest Lyapunov exponent of the
dynamics. The Lyapunov exponents are a generalization of eigenvalues that
apply to trajectories that are more complicated than ﬁxed points. The leading
18 While α tends to increase leverage, when the leverage control policy is procyclical the
behavior is not always monotonic. This is because increasing α tends to increase volatility,
but increasing volatility drives the target leverage down, so the two eﬀects compete with each
other.
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Figure 7: A bifurcation diagram showing the three regimes in the deterministic case. The risk
parameter α and the cyclicality parameter b are varied while holding the other parameters
constant at the value in Table 1. The white region corresponds to a stable ﬁxed point equi-
librium, the light gray region to leverage cycles and the dark gray region to global instability.
The blue line corresponds to the critical leverage λ∗c in Equation 7 at the critical value αc
where the ﬁxed point becomes unstable.
Lyapunov exponent measures the average rate at which the separation between
two nearby points changes in time – when the dynamics are locally stable nearby
points converge exponentially and the leading Lyapunov exponent is negative,
and when they are locally unstable nearby points diverge exponentially and the
leading Lyapunov exponent is positive. The Lyapunov exponent is a property
of a trajectory, but for dissipative systems such as ours, it is also a property
of the attractor. A negative Lyapunov exponent implies a ﬁxed point, and
a positive Lyapunov exponent implies a chaotic attractor. As expected, in
the deterministic case we observe that leverage cycles have a positive leading
Lyapunov exponent, conﬁrming that the dynamics are chaotic.
It is also possible to compute Lyapunov exponents for stochastic dynamics.
To understand the basic idea of how this is done, imagine two realizations of the
dynamics with the same sequence of random shocks, but starting at slightly dif-
ferent initial conditions, see Crutchﬁeld et al. (1982). Because the random noise
is the same in both cases, it is possible to follow two inﬁnitesimally separated
points and measure the rate at which they separate. If the leading Lyapunov
exponent is positive this means that the dynamics will strongly amplify the
noise.
We compare the stability for the stochastic and deterministic cases in Figure
8. This is done for the procyclical case only, since the direct transition from a
ﬁxed point to global instability in the countercyclical case complicates numerical
work (and the countercyclical case is less relevant). In the stochastic case the
critical leverage is computed as the time average of the target leverage when
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Figure 8: A comparison of stability when the dynamics are deterministic vs. stochastic for
the procyclical region (b < 0). As in the previous ﬁgure, the critical leverage λ∗c for the
deterministic case is shown as a blue line. The dashed red line shows the parameter value
where the dynamics become unstable as measured by the leading Lyapunov exponent; note
the transition to chaos occurs at a much lower leverage. The gray line shows the average
target leverage obtained in the simulation, which is roughly independent of b.
the Lyapunov exponent becomes positive. Interestingly, the critical leverage
in the stochastic case ﬁrst starts below the deterministic critical leverage and
then approaches it as b is increased. This indicates that for strongly procyclical
leverage control policies noise destabilizes the system. Somewhat surprisingly,
the average leverage observed in the simulations is independent of b.
The most interesting conclusion from comparing the stochastic and deter-
ministic cases is that when the dynamics are strongly procyclical (i.e. for
−0.5 < b < −0.2) the noise signiﬁcantly lowers the stability threshold. In
contrast, for larger values of b > −0.2 there is little diﬀerence in the stability
threshold in the two cases. This indicates that the dynamics becomes more sta-
ble when the leverage control policy is close to constant leverage. This, together
with the fact that in the countercyclical regime the system goes straight from
stability to global instability, suggests that intermediate values of cyclicality
(nearer to constant leverage) are likely to be most stable.
4.3. Slower adjustment leads to greater stability
The bank’s balance sheet adjustment speed θ has a strong eﬀect on stability
with interesting regulatory implications. Intuitively, decreasing the adjustment
speed should make the system more stable. To take an extreme case, in the limit
τθ → 0, the bank would hold its balance sheet constant regardless of changes
in perceived risk. This would eliminate the feedback loop between asset prices,
perceived risk and investment. Even when θ > 0, decreasing the adjustment
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Figure 9: Critical leverage λ∗c (solid blue line, left vertical axis) and the critical value of the
relative size of the bank to the fund Rc(x∗) (dashed red line, right vertical axis) as a function
of the balance sheet adjustment speed θτ . Other parameters are as in Table 1. The stability
of the ﬁnancial system can be dramatically improved by lowering the adjustment speed.
speed should have a stabilizing eﬀect.19
To test this we study how the critical leverage λ∗c and critical relative size
Rc(x
∗) depend on the adjustment speed θτ (we vary θ and hold τ constant).
The relationship is shown in Figure 9, where the critical leverage is shown on
the left vertical axis and the critical relative size on the right vertical axis.
As expected, both the critical leverage (left axis, continuous line) and critical
relative size of the bank (right axis, dashed line), decrease dramatically as θτ
increases. This suggests that it is possible to dramatically improve the stability
of the ﬁnancial system if institutions adjust to their leverage targets slowly.
Similarly, this illustrates the dangers of mark-to-market accounting, which can
cause balance-sheet adjustments to be too rapid .
5. Leverage control policies
What is the optimal leverage control policy? The mere fact that the endoge-
nous oscillations of prices and volatility depend on the cyclicality parameter b,
as shown in Figure 7, suggests that some policies are better than others. In
19We have considered the case where the bank increases its leverage quicker than it decreases
it. We have done this introducing an asymmetry in the parameter θ that controls the speed
of leverage adjustement, i.e. introducing a parameter θ+ for the speed of levering up and a
parameter θ− for the speed of deleveraging. By allowing such asymmetric speciﬁcation, we
ﬁnd that the dynamics becomes more stable as θ− is reduced. The qualitative behavior of
the system, namely the existence of stable, locally unstable and globally unstable regimes, is
preserved.
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this section we introduce a procedure for scoring policies and search for the best
policy within the family that we have deﬁned. We ﬁnd that the optimal policy
depends on parameters of the model, and in particular on the market power of
banks in relation to the rest of the ﬁnancial system. As the market power of
banks increases the optimal policy becomes increasingly countercyclical, and in
the limit where the banks play a large role in determining prices it approaches
constant leverage.
5.1. Criterion for optimality
We deﬁne an optimal leverage control policy as one that maximizes leverage
for a given level of risk. Maximizing leverage is desirable because it means that,
for a given level of capital, banks are able to lend more money. We don’t model
the real economy here, we simply take it as a given that the ability to obtain
credit if needed is desirable for the real economy.20 From a practical point of
view it is diﬃcult to control risk while searching the parameter space. It is
much easier to control the average leverage, systematically sweep parameters
and measure the resulting risk.
To measure risk we have the luxury of having a simple model, which we
can iterate numerically to generate as much data as we need for statistical
estimation. We can then observe the resulting time series of gains and losses for
the bank and measure the level of risk associated with this time series. Because
this is an ex post measurement of risk, we call this the observed risk.
We now compute the trading gains and losses for the bank. The change in
the bank’s equity due to ﬂuctuations in the price of the risky asset at time t+1
is ΔEB(t) = n(t)Δp(t), where Δp(t) = p(t+1)−p(t). We then deﬁne the equity
return as
(t) = log
(
EB(t) + ΔEB(t)
EB(t)
)
. (8)
Note that this captures both the leverage of the bank and the market return of
the risky asset since
ΔEB(t)
EB(t)
=
n(t)p(t)
EB(t)
Δp(t)
p(t)
= λ(t)wBr(t),
where r(t) is the market return on the risky asset. As expected, leverage am-
pliﬁes the gains and losses. The total change in equity includes readjustments
toward the equity target, but in fact these are small, and the trading losses
above are well approximated by the changes in the equity of the bank between
time steps. For consistency with standard risk estimation we use log-returns
rather than the simple return r(t).
20 There may be circumstances where the real economy might overheat as a result of too
much credit. Nonetheless, we assume that, at a given level of risk, all else equal, the option
of being able to obtain more credit is desirable for both borrowers and lenders. When this is
not the case they can simply abstain from giving or receiving credit, in which case risk will
automatically be lower.
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This then leaves us with the question of how to measure risk. To do this
we follow current thinking as reﬂected in Basel III and use realized shortfall.
The realized shortfall measures the average tail loss of the bank equity beyond
a given quantile q. This is the analog to expected shortfall as used in Basel
III, except in this case it is based on the proﬁts and losses realized ex post in
the simulation of the model. It is a measure of the average loss induced by
large market crashes, as shown in Figure 10. The choice of risk metric is not
important for the results presented here – we would get similar results with any
other reasonable measure of tail risk.
Figure 10: Visual representation of realized shortfall. The solid black lines represents a
hypothetical return distribution. The red vertical dashed line is drawn in correspondence of
the q-quantile of the distribution. The realized shortfall is the average of the distribution in
the red region to the left of the vertical line.
For each set of parameters we estimate the realized shortfall using a time
average with T = 5000 time steps by empirically computing the average loss over
the worst qT time observations.21 Let Θ be the indicator function with Θ(x) = 1
if x > 0 and zero otherwise, and let q be the threshold loss corresponding to
quantile 0 < q < 1, deﬁned through the relation
∑T
t=1Θ(q − (t)) = qT . The
realized shortfall at a conﬁdence level q over a time horizon T is deﬁned as
RSq = − 1
qT
T∑
t=1
(t)Θ(q − (t)). (9)
5.2. Balancing microprudential and macroprudential regulation
To illustrate how the optimal tradeoﬀ between microprudential and macro-
prudential regulation depends on the properties of the ﬁnancial system, in this
section we investigate three representative scenarios. The two key properties
characterizing the scenarios are the strength of the exogenous clustered volatil-
ity and the market power of the banking sector. The market power of the
21 For convenience we choose q and T so that their product is an integer.
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banking sector is determined by the product of the average relative size Rˆ of
the banking sector, the average leverage λˆ and the bank’s portfolio weight wB
for the risky asset. For convenience, to vary the market power of the banking
sector we hold λˆ and wB constant and vary Rˆ.
In each scenario we sweep the cyclicality parameter b in Equation (2). This
determines the degree of procyclicality or countercyclicality of the leverage con-
trol policy. As we do this we hold the average leverage and the relative size of
the banking sector constant at the stated targets, adjusting α and E as needed
in order to maintain these targets. We hold all the other parameters of the
system constant.22 We then measure the observed risk as a function of b and
look for a minimum, corresponding to the optimal policy. The results are shown
in Figure 11.
We investigate three scenarios, with the results described below:
1. Microprudential risk dominates. (Green diamonds) This occurs when
there is strong exogenous clustered volatility and weak bank market power.
To illustrate this we set the GARCH parameters for strong clustered
volatility (a0 = 0.001, a1 = 0.04, b1 = 0.95) and make the banking sector
small (Rˆ = 10−5). In this case there is essentially no systemic risk. The
dynamics are dominated by the exogenous volatility, which the historical
volatility estimator does a good job of predicting. Not surprisingly, the
best leverage control policy is very close to b = −0.5, i.e. it corresponds
to Basel II.23
2. Compromise between microprudential and macroprudential risk. (Red squares)
This occurs when there is weaker exogenous clustered volatility and inter-
mediate bank market power. To illustrate this we set the GARCH param-
eters for weaker clustered volatility (a0 = 0.001, a1 = 0.016, b1 = 0.874)
and increase the relative size of the banking sector to Rˆ = 0.1. The
larger size of the banking sector makes the ﬁnancial system more prone
to endogenous oscillations and the risk is minimized for b∗ ≈ 0.2. This
corresponds to a leverage control policy that is still procyclical but is
nonetheless closer to constant leverage.
3. Macroprudential risk dominates (Blue circles). This occurs when there is
weaker exogenous clustered volatility and strong bank market power. To
illustrate this we set the GARCH parameters as in the previous case but
increase the relative size of the banking sector still further to Rˆ = 0.27.
In this case the system becomes very prone to endogenous oscillations and
22 Because the instantaneous leverage λ¯(t) and the relative size of the banking sector R(t)
are emergent properties that vary in time when there is a leverage cycle, controlling them
requires some care. For a given choice of cyclicality parameter b we vary α and E to match a
target for the average size of the banking sector, Rˆ = 1
T
∑T
t=0 R(t), and the average leverage
λˆ = 1
T
∑T
t=0 λ¯(t). The leverage is held constant at λˆ = 5.8 for all scenarios but the size of
the banking sector Rˆ varies as stated. All other parameters are as in Table 1 unless otherwise
noted.
23 Note that observations for this scenario only extend up to b ≈ 0.1 as for larger values of b
there exists no model solution with the required output targets for relative size and leverage.
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Figure 11: An illustration of how the balance between micro and macroprudential regulation
depends on the stability of the ﬁnancial system. We plot the observed risk as a function of the
cyclicality parameter b, investigating three diﬀerent scenarios corresponding to diﬀerent levels
of clustered volatility and diﬀerent sizes of the banking sector, with other parameters held
constant. Realized shortfall has been normalized by RSq(b = −0.5) for ease of comparison.
(Green diamonds) Microprudential risk dominates when the banking system is relatively
small and the exogenous volatility clustering is high. Not surprisingly, the best policy is
b∗ = −0.5, i.e. Basel II and is strongly procyclical. (Red squares) There is a mixture of
microprudential and macroprudential risk when the size of the banking sector is increased to
Rˆ = 0.1, and the best policy now has b∗ ≈ −0.2, i.e. it is only mildly procyclical. (Blue
circles) Macroprudential risk dominates when the size of the banking sector is increased still
further to Rˆ = 0.27, and the optimal policy has b∗ ≈ 0, i.e. it is very close to constant
leverage. See text for parameters.
the risk is minimized for b∗ ≈ 0, i.e. using a leverage control policy that
is very close to constant leverage.
These three scenarios show that the key determinant of the degree to which
micro vs. macroprudential regulation is required is the market power of the
banking sector. As this increases the system becomes more prone to oscillation
and therefore more susceptible to systemic risk. The dynamics emerge because
of the tension between the stabilizing inﬂuence of the fundamentalist and the
destabilizing inﬂuence of the banking sector. As the latter increases in market
power a higher degree of macroprudential regulation is required.
The balance between micro and macroprudential risk can be stated in simple
terms as a competition between exogenous vs. endogenously generated volatil-
ity. Increasing the size of the banking sector increases the endogenous volatility
and means that the system requires a higher level of macroprudential regulation.
This is obvious in the model, but of course in the real world it is hard to tell who
is generating volatility and therefore diﬃcult to distinguish the two. Nonethe-
less, the market power of the banking sector can potentially be estimated by
regulators and provides an important systemic risk indicator.
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6. Conclusion
6.1. Summary
In this paper we have investigated the eﬀect of risk-based leverage policies on
ﬁnancial stability, developing an extension of the dynamical model of leverage
cycles introduced by Aymanns and Farmer (2014). The model is a simple agent-
based model that includes a leveraged bank, a fundamentalist unleveraged fund
and an outside lender, and can be described in terms of a discrete dynamical
system deﬁned by six recursion equations. We have roughly calibrated the
model to match basic features of the S&P500 trajectory prior and following the
2007/2008 crash. The model can be simulated in a stochastic or a deterministic
regime.
We consider a one parameter family of leverage control policies that varies
between procyclical and countercyclical policies. Under a procyclical policy the
bank decreases its leverage when perceived risk is high. In contrast, under a
countercyclical policy the bank is allowed to increase its leverage when perceived
risk is high.24
We study the stability of the model for diﬀerent values of bank leverage
and the cyclicality of the leverage policy. We ﬁnd three diﬀerent regimes: (1)
For low leverage the system is stable and settles into a ﬁxed point. (2) As
leverage is increased leverage cycles emerge (though for countercyclical policies
(b > 0) this region is small). (3) As leverage is increased further the system
becomes globally unstable. The critical leverage at which cycles emerge depends
on whether the system is deterministic or stochastic. In the deterministic case
the critical leverage is constant for all values of the cyclicality parameter b. In
the stochastic case the critical leverage increases with b.
In our model both procyclical and countercyclical policies are associated with
positive feedback loops that can amplify market ﬂuctuations. When leverage is
procyclical, banks reduce their balance sheets when perceived volatility is high,
pushing prices down and increasing volatility even further, which can trigger
a crash. When leverage is countercyclical, in contrast, high volatility leads to
higher leverage. This increases the demand for assets, which pushes up both
prices and volatility. This positive feedback loop can also be destabilizing.
Our main contribution is the evaluation of diﬀerent leverage control policies.
Our central result is that the optimal policy depends on the parameters of the
ﬁnancial system. The key properties are the market power of the bank (which
is the product of its leverage, its relative size and its portfolio weight for the
risky asset) and the the amplitude of the exogenous clustered volatility.
In the microprudential limit when the market power of the bank is small and
exogenous volatility is high, the optimal policy is simply given by Basel II, i.e.
24 It is important to note that our deﬁnition of policy cyclicality does not refer to the
level of a macroeconomic indicator such as the credit-to-GDP ratio or the level of asset prices
but is deﬁned solely by the bank’s response to changes in perceived risk. Thus the counter-
cyclical policies proposed in this model diﬀer from alternative policies such as the Basel III
countercyclical capital buﬀer, see for example FPC (2014).
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Value-at-Risk (b = −0.5). As the banking sector becomes larger (either through
increasing equity or leverage) the optimal policy becomes less procyclical. In
the limit when the bank is very large or highly leveraged, the optimal policy is
constant leverage, b = 0.
6.2. Discussion
Our paper clearly illustrates the interplay between exogenous and endoge-
nous volatility: the microprudential response to exogenous volatility can itself
cause endogenous volatility which may dominate over exogenous volatility. This
insight is crucial for the eﬀective design of macroprudential policies. Such poli-
cies must critically evaluate systemic risks, and make an appropriate tradeoﬀ
between micro and macroprudential risk.
The fact that the degree of cyclicality of the optimal policy depends on the
market power of the banking sector suggests that regulation should be ﬂexible
to adapt to the ﬁnancial environment. The market power depends on both
leverage and the size of the banking sector, suggesting that regulation needs to
take both of these into account. Limits on leverage alone are not suﬃcient.
The most interesting aspect of our model is the sharp and spontaneous emer-
gence of a leverage cycle, even in the deterministic limit. When we use the
industry standard two year moving average to compute historical volatility, and
set the other parameters of the model to plausible values, we automatically get
a leverage cycle with a period of oscillation in the 10 - 15 year range. The cycle
consists of a slow rise in asset prices and leverage and a slow drop in volatility,
which abruptly ends with a crash in asset prices and leverage and a spike in
volatility. The fact that this resembles the Great Moderation and the subse-
quent crisis is interesting. It suggests that regulating risk in the style of Basel II
might have been the cause of these events, and that the collapse of the housing
bubble may have only been the spark that happened to trigger the crash. Of
course we are not claiming that this is true – there are many other possible
causes and the real situation is far too complicated. We want to stress the
word “suggestive”. We view our model as a cautionary tale, indicating the need
to focus more attention on the systemic side eﬀects of risk management. Our
model shows that caution is needed: The cure can be worse than the disease.
The results of Section 4.3 gives a clear prescription for improved risk man-
agement. We show there that lowering the adjustment speed for leverage targets
exerts a strong stabilizing force and can have a dramatic eﬀect on the critical
leverage.
This raises the question of whether Basel III has a suﬃciently strong limit
on leverage and a suﬃciently strong capital buﬀer to prevent a leverage cycle
like this from happening in the future. A research agenda for answering this
question might build on our work to make a more realistic model. Among
other things, a more realistic model would allow the bank’s portfolio weights to
vary, allowing for phenomena like ﬂight to quality; allow the possibly of default;
include more realistic aspects of the heterogeneity of the ﬁnancial system; and
implement a more realistic version of the Basel III rules, including risk weights
and an asset price-dependent capital buﬀer. Such a model could be developed,
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and we believe it could provide a useful tool for monitoring the stability of the
ﬁnancial system, testing the eﬀectiveness of Basel III, and evaluating possible
alternatives.
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Appendix A. Detailed description of the model
In the following we will describe the modeling details of the assets, the
bank, the fund and the market. The model is set in discrete time indexed by
t = {τ, 2τ, ..., T τ}, where τ is the length of a time-step. We leave the length of
the time-step as a free parameter in order to allow us to calibrate the model.
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Appendix A.1. Assets
Let p(t) be the price of the risky asset at time t. The risky asset can be
thought of as any traded security such as stocks, asset backed securities or bonds.
We assume that there is exactly one unit of the risky asset which is inﬁnitely
divisible. The return on the price of the risky asset is r(t) = log[p(t)/p(t− τ)].
We denote the fraction of the risky asset held by the bank by n(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Since
only the bank and the fund can invest in the risky asset, the fraction of the
risky asset held by the fund is simply 1− n(t). The risk free asset is analogous
to cash. The price of the risk free asset is constant and equal to one.
Appendix A.2. Agents
There are two representative agents. The ﬁrst is a bank, denoted B, and the
second is a fund, denoted F.
Appendix A.3. Bank
Balance sheet. Assume the bank divides its assets AB(t) in a ﬁxed ratio wB
between the risky asset and cash cB(t), so that the banks owns n(t) shares of
the risky asset with price p(t). The relevant accounting relations are:
Risky investment = n(t)p(t) = wBAB(t),
Risk free investment = cB(t) = (1− wB)AB(t),
Total assets = AB(t) = cB(t) + n(t)p(t).
The bank’s liabilities LB have a maturity of one time step and are freely rolled
over or expanded. There is no limit to the reduction in LB; in principle the
bank could pay back its entire liabilities in one time step.
The bank adjusts its equity toward a ﬁxed target E. This guarantees that
neither the bank nor the fund asymptotically accumulates all the wealth and
makes the long-term dynamics stationary, with only a small eﬀect on the short
term dynamics. The dividends paid out by the bank are invested in the fund
and new capital invested in the bank comes from the fund. If the bank deviates
from its equity target E it either pays out dividends or attracts new capital
from outside investors at a rate η to adjust its equity closer to the target, so
that its equity changes by
κB(t) = η(E − EB(t)). (A.1)
Taking both the changes in price and the active adjustments in equity into
account, the bank’s equity at time t+ τ is
EB(t+ τ) = n(t)p(t+ τ) + cB(t)− LB(t) + κB(t), (A.2)
and the bank’s leverage is
λ(t+ τ) =
Total Assets
Equity
=
n(t)p(t+ τ)/wB
EB(t+ τ)
. (A.3)
We assume the bank enforces risk control through a target leverage λ¯(t), corre-
sponding to a target portfolio value A¯B(t)(t) = λ¯(t)EB(t).
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Estimation of perceived risk. The bank relies on historical data to estimate
the perceived variance of the risky asset σ2(t). To do so the bank computes an
exponential moving average of squared returns of the risky asset. This approach
is similar to the RiskMetrics approach, see Longerstaey (1996). In particular
σ2(t+ τ) = (1− τδ)σ2(t) + τδr2(t)
= (1− τδ)σ2(t) + τδ
(
log
[
p(t)
p(t− τ)
]
tVaR
τ
)2
, (A.4)
where the term tVar/τ rescales the return over one time-step τ to the return
over the horizon tVaR used in the computation of the capital requirement. The
parameter τδ ∈ (0, 1) implicitly deﬁnes the length of the time window over
which the historical estimation is performed. We deﬁne the typical time tδ as
the time at which an observation made at t−tδ has decayed to 1/e of its original
contribution to the exponential moving average. Thus tδ = −τ/ log[1−τδ] ≈ 1/δ
for τδ 	 1.
Appendix A.4. Fund investor
The fund investor represents the rest of the ﬁnancial system, and plays the
role of a fundamentalist noise trader. Since the fund is not leveraged its assets
AF(t) are equal to its equity, i.e. EF(t) = AF(t). Just as for the bank, the
fund invests wF(t) of its assets in the risky asset and 1 − wF(t) in cash; a key
diﬀerence is that the fund adjusts its portfolio weight wF(t) whereas the bank’s
weight is ﬁxed. The relevant accounting relations are
Risky investment = (1− n(t))p(t) = wF(t)AF(t),
Risk free investment = cF(t) = (1− wF(t))AF(t),
Total assets = AF(t) = cF(t) + (1− n(t))p(t),
and the fund’s equity is
EF(t+ τ) = (1− n(t))p(t+ τ) + cF(t) + κF(t). (A.5)
The fund’s cash ﬂow κF := −κB mirrors the dividend payments or capital
injections of the bank.
We have already explained the motivation for the fund’s demand function in
the main text. Here, we simply note that we rescale the deviation of the price
of the risky asset to the fundamental by the current price of the risky asset
in order to make portfolio weight adjustments independent of the scale of the
price of the risky asset. Otherwise, the portfolio weight would likely exceed its
natural bounds, i.e. wF ∈ [0, 1]. In order to introduce heteroskedasticity we
make s2 time varying according to a simple GARCH(1,1) process of the form
s2(t) = a0 + a1χ
2(t− 1) + b1s2(t− 1),
χ(t) = s(t)ξ(t).
(A.6)
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When the parameters a1 and b1 are zero the returns r(t) of the risky asset are
normally distributed as n(t) → 0, i.e. as the fund dominates the market, and
the price process will resemble a mean reverting random walk with constant
volatility.
Appendix A.5. Market mechanism
The price of the risky asset is determined by market clearing. For this we
construct the demand functions for the bank and fund (DB and DF respectively)
as follows:
DB(t+ τ) =
1
p(t+ τ)
wBAB(t+ τ)
=
1
p(t+ τ)
wB(n(t)p(t+ τ) + cB(t) + ΔB(t)),
DF(t+ τ) =
1
p(t+ τ)
wF(t+ τ)AB(t+ τ)
=
1
p(t+ τ)
wF(t+ τ)((1− n(t))p(t+ τ) + cF(t)).
Recall that there is a supply of exactly one unit of the risky asset that is inﬁnitely
divisible. We can then compute the market clearing price by equating demand
and supply 1 = DB(t+ τ)+DF(t+ τ). Solving for the market clearing price we
obtain
p(t+ τ) =
wB(cB(t) + ΔB(t)) + wF(t+ τ)cF(t)
1− wBn(t)− wF(t+ τ)(1− n(t)) . (A.7)
Given the new price we can compute the fraction of the risky asset owned by
the bank as follows:
n(t+ τ) =
1
p(t+ τ)
wB(n(t)p(t+ τ) + cB(t) + ΔB(t)). (A.8)
Appendix A.6. Finding the ﬁxed point
We begin by considering the conditions for a ﬁxed point of the g(·) as deﬁned
in Equation 5.25
1. The price is at the noise trader’s fundamental value:
p∗ = μ =⇒ wF(t+ τ) = wF(t).
2. The bank’s perceived risk is 0:
σ2∗ = 0 ∨ p(t) = p(t− τ) = μ =⇒ σ2(t) = σ2(t+ τ).
3. The bank is at its target leverage consistent with σ2∗ = 0:
λ∗ = A
∗
B
A∗B−L∗B = λ¯(t) = α(σ
2
0)
b =⇒ ΔB(t) = 0.
25For the deterministic system it is simple to derive a set of diﬀerential equations for the
continuous-time limit. We have checked that the qualitative behavior of the system in con-
tinuous time is the same as that of the discrete system in this case. For simplicity, and for
consistency with Section 5 where numerical simulations for the discrete stochastic case are
considered, we present here results for the discrete dynamical system.
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4. The bank is at its target equity:
E∗B = A
∗
B − L∗B = E = =⇒ ΔEB(t) = 0.
5. The bank’s ownership of the risky asset is consistent with the price, lever-
age target and equity target at the ﬁxed point:
n∗ = λ∗E∗BwB/μ.
The ﬁxed point is therefore:
x∗ = (σ2∗, w∗F, p
∗, n∗, L∗B, p
′∗)
= (0, wF(0), μ,
1
μ
ασ2b0 EwB, (ασ
2b
0 − 1)E, μ),
(A.9)
where we picked w∗F = wF(t = 0), the initial value of the fund’s investment
weight, since at p∗ = μ any wF will remain unchanged. Since w∗F is not speciﬁed
by the ﬁxed point condition, there is essentially a set of ﬁxed points for wF ∈
[0, 1]. As such it is useful to interpret w∗F as a parameter of the model determined
by an appropriate initial condition. We choose wF(0) = 0.5 throughout.
We can distinguish two cases for the existence of the ﬁxed point. In the ﬁrst
case σ20 = 0. In this case, provided that b < 0, the ﬁxed point has an inﬁnity in
n∗. This ﬁxed point has no economic meaning. Therefore, we will restrict our
analysis to the case where σ20 > 0 in which the ﬁxed point is well deﬁned.
In the case studies in Figure 4 and Figure 5 in Section 3 we saw that the
properties of the system dynamics depended heavily on the relative proportions
of the fund versus the bank as this determines the impact of the bank on the
price of the risky asset. Therefore, before moving on we deﬁne the relative size
of the bank to the fund at the ﬁxed point as:
R(x∗) =
A∗B
A∗F
=
λ∗E∗B
(1− n∗)p∗/w∗F
=
(
μ
E
1
ασ2b0 wF(0)
− wB
wF(0)
)−1
(A.10)
Clearly, as the equity of the bank goes up, its size relative to the noise trader
will increase. Similarly if the bank risk parameter α or the risk oﬀ set σ20 is
increased, the bank’s leverage at the ﬁxed point will increase whereby its size
relative to the fund will increase.
Appendix A.7. Existence of critical leverage and bank riskiness
In order to assess the stability of the ﬁxed point we compute the Jacobian
matrix Jij = ∂gi/∂xj . We then evaluate the Jacobian at the ﬁxed point x
∗
and compute the eigenvalues ei of the corresponding matrix. In this particular
case the eigenvalues cannot be found analytically. Instead, we compute the
eigenvalues numerically using the parameters speciﬁed in Table 1. With the
help of the eigenvalues we can distinguish between local stability and instability
of the ﬁxed point. If the absolute value of the largest eigenvalue |e+| > 1 the
system exhibits chaotic oscillations, while it is locally stable if |e+| < 1. We
assess the global stability of the system via numerical iteration of the map in
Equation 5.
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Figure A.12: Numerical evaluation of the destabilizing eigenvalues (speciﬁc results will depend
on parameter choice) for diﬀerent values of α. The destabilizing eigenvalues are the two largest
eigenvalues that ﬁrst cross the unit circle from within.
Now, suppose we increase the bank risk parameter α and study how the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian change while keeping all other model parameters
constant. It is clear from Equation A.10 and Equation A.9, that as we increase
α we will increase both the bank’s leverage and relative size to the fund at the
ﬁxed point. We therefore expect that ﬁrstly the bank’s market impact increases
and secondly that the bank becomes more fragile due to its increased leverage.
Thus overall, we expect that if we increase α suﬃciently, we should observe a
transition from the ﬁxed point dynamics to leverage cycles. We summarize the
evolution of the two largest eigenvalues of the Jacobian in the complex plane
in Figure A.12. The eigenvalues start out at a point within the unit circle on
the complex plane (i.e. |ei| < 1). Then as α is increased the magnitude of the
eigenvalues increases. The critical bank riskiness αc at which the eigenvalues
cross the unit circle, corresponds to the point at which leverage cycles emerge.
Since we keep all other parameters constant, this critical bank riskiness also
corresponds to a critical leverage and a critical relative size of the bank to the
fund. In particular
λ∗c = αcσ
2b
0 ,
Rc(x
∗) =
λ∗cE
∗
B
(1− n∗)p∗/w∗F
.
(A.11)
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